私の履歴書（鳥羽博道-13）
会社を設立して二年が経ち、卸先が徐々に増えていくにつれ、私は「僕はこの若さでこれだけの事ができるのに」と思い、世間の大人が皆、馬鹿に見えてきた。
しかし卸という商売は、取引先から「明日からは要らない」と言われれば売り上げが無くなるという極めて脆い基盤の上に立っている。私は日銭の入る喫茶店を開き、経営と生活を安定させようと考えた。
東京・新橋に条件に合った店舗が売りに出されており、友人知人から七百万円を借金した。店の明け渡しを目前にして、相手方から契約違反をでっち上げられ、その七百万円を騙し取られてしまった。
私は相手方に駆けつけ、詰め寄った。このままでは殺されかねないと思ったのか相手が警察に電話し、たちまち三台のパトカーが来て、私は両脇を警官に抱えられ警察署に連行されてしまった。「殺すつもりなんて毛頭無い。騙されたお金を取り返しに行っただけだ」と説明すると「あなたがやられた事は民事で、あなたがやろうとした事は刑事事件になるんですよ」と警官が言う。私の表情に鬼気迫る物があったのだろう。
私は弁護士を雇って相手を訴えることにした。超一流の大学を出た若い弁護士だった。裁判はすんなり進むものと思っていたが、意外に時間かかかり、費用が続かなくなる不安が生じてきた。幸い裁判は私に有利に働き始め、裁判長の勧告で相手方は和解を申し入れてきた。
やれやれと安堵したのもつかの間。和解成立寸前というところで、なんと私の側の弁護士が迂闊にも「裁判費用が続かないところでした」と言ってしまったのだ。相手方は態度を急変させ、和解を取り下げ裁判を続けると言い出した。裁判費用が続かなくなりとうとう七百万円はそのまま相手に取られてしまった。
私は自暴自棄に陥り自分を騙した相手はもちろん、若い弁護士も恨んだ。ところが恨みつらみの日々を過ごすうちに、私は自分の心がすっかりすさんでしまっている事に気づいた。
これはいけない。もうこれ以上、人を憎むのは止めよう。人を騙す事が出来るのはその人の生い立ちが悪かったからだ。そうでなければそんな事は出来ない筈だ。
ただ、騙した人間の人生が良くなって、騙された人間の人生が悪くなるのでは世の中の道理が通らない。道理の通らない世の中なら生きているわけにはいかない。それならば、この世の中で道理を通す為には自分がなにがなんでも成功しなければならない。
そして、どこかで私を騙した人物に会った時、心から「お元気ですか」と言える自分になろう。もし元気でなければ助けて上げよう。助けて上げた時、相手が真に人間としての心を取り戻せる筈だ。そう気持ちを切り替えた。
私はこの一件で、どんなにうまくいっている時でも決して驕ってはならないと悟った。これ以来、ちょっと自分が思い上がりそうになると「また落ちるぞ」という声が聞こえてくるようになった。
また、世間の大人が本当に偉く見えてきた。大人というものは、自分に降りかかる火の粉を未然に振り払う知恵を持っているものなのだと理解した。
---日本経済新聞2009年2月14日
ドトールコーヒー「勝つか死ぬか」の創業記 (日経ビジネス人文庫)
- 作者: 鳥羽博道
- 出版社/メーカー: 日本経済新聞出版社
- 発売日: 2008/09/01
- メディア: 文庫
- 購入: 5人 クリック: 41回
- この商品を含むブログ (28件) を見る
2008年の経済統計を見る
| 有効求人倍率 | 完全失業率 | |
|---|---|---|
| 1999年度 | 0.49 | 4.7 |
| 2000年度 | 0.60 | 4.7 |
| 2001年度 | 0.56 | 5.2 |
| 2002年1月 | 0.51 | 5.3 |
| 2002年2月 | 0.50 | 5.3 |
| 2002年3月 | 0.51 | 5.2 |
| 2002年4月 | 0.52 | 5.2 |
| 2002年5月 | 0.53 | 5.4 |
| 2002年6月 | 0.53 | 5.4 |
| 2002年7月 | 0.54 | 5.4 |
| 2002年8月 | 0.54 | 5.4 |
| 2002年9月 | 0.55 | 5.4 |
| 2002年10月 | 0.56 | 5.5 |
| 2002年11月 | 0.57 | 5.3 |
| 有効求人倍率 | 完全失業率 | |
|---|---|---|
| 2008年2月 | 0.97 | 3.9 |
| 2008年3月 | 0.95 | 3.8 |
| 2008年4月 | 0.93 | 4.0 |
| 2008年5月 | 0.92 | 4.0 |
| 2008年6月 | 0.91 | 4.1 |
| 2008年7月 | 0.89 | 4.0 |
| 2008年8月 | 0.86 | 4.2 |
| 2008年9月 | 0.84 | 4.0 |
| 2008年10月 | 0.80 | 3.7 |
| 2008年11月 | 0.76 | 3.9 |
| 2008年12月 | 0.72 | 4.4 |
完全失業率はまだ5%に達していないが、有効求人倍率の下降具合から推測すると、近く5%台に突入することは間違い。
GDPを支える要素は、3つ。
- 民間の消費と投資
- 政府の消費・投資
- 輸出と輸入の差
民間の消費を見てみよう。2008年の消費支出を掲げる。
消費支出（2世帯以上）
| 前年比 | |
|---|---|
| 2008年2月 | 0.0 |
| 2008年3月 | ▲1.6 |
| 2008年4月 | ▲2.7 |
| 2008年5月 | ▲3.2 |
| 2008年6月 | ▲1.8 |
| 2008年7月 | ▲0.5 |
| 2008年8月 | ▲4.0 |
| 2008年9月 | ▲2.3 |
| 2008年10月 | ▲3.8 |
| 2008年11月 | ▲0.5 |
| 2008年12月 | ▲4.6 |
前年比マイナスだらけ。つまり、民間の消費は伸びていません。
一方、GDPを支える2つ目の要素である政府の消費・投資について。
公共工事請負金額
| 前年比 | |
|---|---|
| 2005年度 | ▲5.6 |
| 2006年度 | ▲5.2 |
| 2007年度 | ▲4.1 |
| 2008年1月 | ▲3.5 |
| 2008年2月 | 13.1 |
| 2008年3月 | ▲12.6 |
| 2008年4月 | ▲4.7 |
| 2008年5月 | ▲9.6 |
| 2008年6月 | ▲11.3 |
| 2008年7月 | 13.8 |
| 2008年8月 | ▲6.0 |
| 2008年9月 | 5.5 |
| 2008年10月 | ▲0.4 |
| 2008年11月 | ▲2.8 |
前年比マイナスの月が7割超。こちらも伸びてません。
麻生総理が施政方針演説で述べた
国民の安心を考えた場合、政府は小さければよい、というわけではありません。
というコトバを信じて見守りましょう。
さて貿易・通関はどうか。まず2001年付近の貿易収支。
貿易・通関
| 輸出（億円） | 輸入（億円） | 差引（億円） | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1999年度 | 485,476 | 364,516 | 120,960 |
| 2000年度 | 520,452 | 424,494 | 95,958 |
| 2001年度 | 485,931 | 414,796 | 71,135 |
そして、2008年付近の貿易収支。
貿易・通関
| 輸出（億円） | 輸入（億円） | 差引（億円） | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2005年度 | 682,902 | 605,113 | 77,789 |
| 2006年度 | 774,606 | 684,473 | 90,133 |
| 2007年度 | 851,159 | 749,038 | 102,121 |
| 2008年2月 | 69,754 | 60,120 | 9,634 |
| 2008年3月 | 76,825 | 65,736 | 11,089 |
| 2008年4月 | 68,914 | 64,162 | 4,752 |
| 2008年5月 | 68,090 | 64,512 | 3,578 |
| 2008年6月 | 71,537 | 70,346 | 1,191 |
| 2008年7月 | 76,287 | 75,465 | 822 |
| 2008年8月 | 70,536 | 73,857 | -3,321 |
| 2008年9月 | 73,640 | 72,784 | 856 |
| 2008年10月 | 69,238 | 69,909 | -671 |
| 2008年11月 | 53,254 | 55,503 | -2,249 |
| 2008年12月 | 48,319 | 51,542 | -3,223 |
10月から3ヵ月連続貿易赤字です。貿易収支も悪化しています。
最後に企業倒産件数を見てます。これは月1,500件が危険域だと言われています。
企業倒産件数
| 件数 | |
|---|---|
| 2008年2月 | 1,149 |
| 2008年3月 | 1,347 |
| 2008年4月 | 1,215 |
| 2008年5月 | 1,290 |
| 2008年6月 | 1,324 |
| 2008年7月 | 1,372 |
| 2008年8月 | 1,254 |
| 2008年9月 | 1,408 |
| 2008年10月 | 1,429 |
| 2008年11月 | 1,277 |
| 2008年12月 | 1,362 |
1,500件/月が間近ですね。こわいこわい。
When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change
When Markets Collide: Investment Strategies for the Age of Global Economic Change
- 作者: Mohamed El-Erian
- 出版社/メーカー: McGraw-Hill Education
- 発売日: 2008/06/13
- メディア: ハードカバー
- 購入: 1人
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CHAPTER1 ABERRATIONS. CONUNDRUMS, AND PUZZLES
In the Introduction, I noted that over the last few years, economic and financial issues have arisen that could not be explained using existing models, mindsets, or prior experiences. As a result, they came to be called "aberrations," "conun-drums," and "puzzles," and many in the marketplace dismissed them as being just "noise" and, as such, devoid of meaningful information. But these issues were, in fact, signals of underlying shifts or transformations that have proven to be of great consequence---in particular, as illustrated in the crisis that shook the foundation of the international financial system starring in the summer of 2007. These signals remain significant to investors now and will continue to be so in the future.
Perhaps the most famous reaction to the phenomena of anomalies and inconsistencies was contained in then Fed chairman Alan Greenspan's semiannual monetary report to the Senate. In the February 2005 report, he noted that "for the moment, the broadly unanticipated behavior of world bond markets remains a conundrum." I still remember the reaction on PIMCO's Trade floor when Greenspan used the word "conundrum," Many were struck by how the most-respected, well-read, and influential policy maker of the day did not have an explanation for something as basic as the shape of the U.S. interest rate curve (that is, the "yield curve").
Greenspan was far from alone. Later in 2005, The Economist ran a cover story about the puzzling global economy. A few months later, Larry Summers, the Harvard professor and former secretary of the U.S. Treasury, referred to "an irony of our time" when reflecting on the configuration of global payments imbalances. He was commenting on the large flow of capital from developing to industrial countries, or from the poor to the rich---a flow that runs completely counter not only to what is predicted in economic textbooks but also the logic of rich-poor relationships. Summers observed: "To my knowledge it was neither predictable nor predicted and the implications are large and have not yet fully been thought through," The finance minister of New Zealand was similarly perplexed when asked to comment about the actions of investors in his country. In a September 2006 interview with the Financial Times, he described these investors as "irrational," noting that their investment behavior was consistent with "someone [who] would have to be slightly strange."
For me, the biggest puzzle of all centered on the reaction of investors---particularly the ability and willingness of the financial system to overconsume and overproduce risky products in the context of such large systemic uncertainty. Like others, I was struck by how two phenomena that you would expect to be negatively correlated ended up being positively correlated for so long---namely, on the one hand, the significant fall in the premiums that investors were paid to assume risk and, on the other hand, the investors' desire to assume even more of this mispriced risk.
The dynamics behind this positive correction, which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 2, went something like this: Some investors were hesitant to accept the lower expected returns associated with the generalized decline in risk premiums. Accordingly, they tried hard to squeeze out additional returns. Leverage served as the best way to do so: By borrowing, they could put more money to work in their best investment idea; and this seemingly made sense as long as the expected return was higher than the cost of borrowing. In turn, the Leveraged positions pushed risk premiums even lower, encouraging another round of leverage.
That cycle is just one illustration of the amazing sense of calm and self-confidence that prevailed despite the abundance of things that could not be explained. Rather than stay on the sideline until proper explanations emerged, many investors rushed into ever riskier trades and even higher leverage. Wall Street responded by putting the production of ever-more-complex products into overdrive. Many of these products offered investors "embedded leverage," playing directly into the hands of those looking to magnify what would otherwise be for them, low expected returns. And while national and multilateral policy makers expressed a mix of concerns and bewilderment, no meaningful actions were taken to "take the punch bowl away."
A few months later, the world economy found itself in the grip of significant market turmoil. Unlike the majority of the global financial crises of the preceding 25 years, this one was triggered by events in the world's most sophisticated economy, the United States, It impacted segments closest to the monetary authorities---namely, the interactions among banks. The results were bizarre to say the least.
Consider the highly unusual intraday swing in interest rates of over 100 basis points that occurred in the U.S. Treasury bill market, that on at least one occasion, was associated with highly unusual erosions in liquidity and market flows. You would expect such a systemwide event to cause collateral damage or be contagious, perhaps even envisioning people lining up outside banks to pull their money out. Based on recent history, you might also expect the casualties to be in an emerging economy with a weak banking system and not in another industrial country with a sophisticated financial system.
There, was indeed a bank run, but it came from the United Kingdom. The event panicked the government into guaranteeing all bank deposits and triggered an amazing turnaround in the publicly stated policy of a highly respected central bank---the Bank of England. And there was collateral damage to an extent that in years past would have resulted in job losses on the part of ministers of finance and central hankers in emerging economies and in some cases, prime ministers and presidents. But this time, the high-profile casualties were the CEOs of some of the most influential banks in the world and other senior corporate officials.
The list of aberrations goes on. Interestingly, the numerous instances did not involve just one market, one country, or one set of actors. They pertained to several. Also notable was that the more usual tendency of inconsistencies occurring sequentially gave way to the emergence of inconsistencies occurring simultaneously.
It is therefore no suprise that, in the presence of so many anomalies, some conventional approaches to making investments have become less effective. Conventional strategies and business models are no longer adequately capturing the real dynamics that exist in the global economy; and the dominant industry players are being challenged by competitors who once seemed to be undertaken only lower-value-added activities and, as such, were not viewed as influential market participants. At the same time, policy measures and coordination mechanisms increasingly lack relevance and effectiveness.
In the following sections, I will discuss the nature of the aberrations, conundrums, and puzzles that have recently emerged. By focusing on topics that relate to market and policy issues, it will be clear that these inconsistencies contained important signals about underlying global transformations, In the process, I will shed light on the future evolution of the fundamentals that influence expected returns and risk---namely, global growth, trade, price formation, and financial flows.
Global Payments Imbalances and the Role of Developing Economics
Economics textbooks agree that the baseline expectation for the natural direction of capital flows across borders in the global economy is from developed countries to those countries still in the process of developing. The presumption is that because they are capital scarce, developing countries can offer a potentially higher expected return on a unit of invested funds than that offered by developed countries. The argument is based on the relative cheapness of labor in developing countries, as well as the relative lack of sophistication in their financial markets. Both factors serve to enhance the expected return on a unit of capital coming from developed economies.
This natural flow can be interrupted or even reversed by certain risk factors. For example, concerns about barriers to exit---such as capital controls or outright nationalization and confiscation---will discourage the flow of capital to developing countries. After all, why invest in a foreign country if you cannot repatriate the dividends, profits, and remaining capital as appropriate? For those reasons, the overall flow of capital can change directions---often so much so that there are outright large reversals in conjunction with episodes of capital flight as nationals of these countries also seek to protect or disguise their holdings.
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the last few years have seen a sharp and sustained change in both the expected and historical trends. For example, at the end of the 1990s, the trend of developing countries' registering account deficits over time turned as these countries began to run up sizable surpluses---that is, they saved more than they invested. These surpluses have been large and persistent, resulting in a significant accumulation of international reserves. For example, as of 2007 China's reserve growth had been running at around 10 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) for three straight years.
Another unusual aspect to these surpluses is that they have been accompanied by a pickup in economic growth and imports, not a decline. This is in stark contrast to past episodes when developing countries had to resort to highly
